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Emergency managers face many challenges regardless of the size or location of 
their jurisdiction. Traditional threats such as hurricanes, flooding, tornados, 
wildfires, and earthquakes are quickly being joined by newer threats that are 
potentially high-impact, but very unlikely to occur. Examples of these low 
probability, high consequence (LPHC) events include foreign animal disease, 
bioterrorism, mass care for special needs populations, pandemic influenza, mass 
fatality incidents, terrorism, and other catastrophic events. Although all hazards 
impact the physical, social, and economic welfare of the affected community, 
these high-impact events are catastrophic in nature and can result in significant 
loss of life, considerable physical destruction, massive economic volatility, and 
widespread public panic. However, unlike the traditional hazards that are 
identified in a given community, LPHC events are rare occurrences and 
extremely unlikely to occur in local communities. 
Unfortunately, local emergency managers are often limited by lack of funding 
or dependency on grants, which can lead to planning and preparedness 
challenges.1  Moreover, emergency managers are often also hampered by political 
hurdles including unsupportive political supervision and multiple job functions 
covered by one person.2 These types of limitations make response to any 
challenge difficult, much less responding to an event with the scope and scale of 
an LPHC incident. 
Regardless of size or capability, emergency managers must also coordinate 
county-wide application and compliance to the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS),3 which fundamentally 
call for emergency planning at the lowest possible level with flexibility and 
expansion to meet the needs of escalating incidents. Local communities respond 
until their resources are exhausted, at which time the surrounding jurisdictions 
supplement this response. A similar expansion occurs from county government 
to state government and state government to federal government. This concept of 
operational expansion is fundamental to an effective response that is accountable 
and efficient. 
Unfortunately, unlike traditional events, LPHC incidents cannot be planned 
for in this way. LPHC events can be rare events or common occurrences (ex: 
tornados and hurricanes) of an extremely rare severity.  Moreover, LPHC events 
can be limited to a local community (the EF-5 tornado in Greensburg, KS in 
2007), regionalized (Hurricane Katrina in 2005) or geographically dispersed (the 
anthrax attacks of 2001). Regardless of the impact size of the LPHC event, the 
local resources and management capability of the impacted communities were 
immediately exceeded. Consequently, surrounding areas (or even states) had to 
send resources to these areas for response and recovery efforts. These support 
resources were often accompanied by well-trained teams, crews, or squads that 
were directed to perform specialized functions such as water rescue, 
decontamination, mass care, incident management, and debris removal.4 This 
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kind of specialized support to the impacted local communities better enables 
them to use their remaining response components to restore basic infrastructure 
such as public safety and utilities. 
Considering how unlikely LPHC events are, it is difficult for many 
communities to successfully prepare for these types of events. As already 
established, the multitude of responsibilities most often tasked to emergency 
managers and emergency responders make it almost impossible to dedicate time 
to training and preparedness for LPHC events. Moreover, the cost of personnel 
training time and the necessary specialized equipment is an economic 
impossibility for the average community, which explains why most local response 
teams (ex: HazMat or S.W.A.T.) are shared as a regional or state asset.5 
One example of the resource and personnel burden required to prepared for 
LPHC events is how first responders prepare for inhaled health hazards such as 
anthrax, smallpox, influenza, and other biological and chemical agents. OSHA 
and the CDC recommend, at minimum, N-95 particle respirator masks as an 
appropriate level of personal protection for respiratory threats including many of 
the bioterrorism agents. Certification to wear N-95 (or higher) respirator 
protection includes annual medical clearance and fit testing for each wearer.6 
Consequently, employers – including local first responders – must now dedicate 
personnel time to perform this function, monitor it, and absorb costs related to 
the purchase of masks to ensure the proper functionality. Moreover, these masks 
are meant to be worn once and then disposed of appropriately. Even if they 
functionally could be reused, it would be a planning fallacy for local emergency 
planners to make this assumption.  Consequently, even moderately-priced masks 
can cost thousands of dollars if purchased by a local community in an attempt to 
prepare the local staff. As already stated, this type of financial burden is very 
difficult for an average community. 
Another challenge for local communities, particularly those with significant 
livestock populations, is how to prepare for the threat of agroterrorism.  If an act 
of agroterrorism was executed at a given livestock farm, a multitude of cascading 
events would transpire, potentially threatening $200 billion in annual gross farm 
sales.9 Specifically, all exposed animals – including those that had been shipped 
elsewhere – would need to be culled immediately. This type of swift action might 
also necessitate the stopping of livestock transport throughout the community, 
county, or even state. Local livestock owners, much less the local emergency 
manager, might be challenged to understand the full implications of the 
necessary actions. Quick action is necessary to minimize the economic impact, 
not only locally but throughout the national farm-to-table continuum.7 This type 
of LPHC event would immediately overwhelm even the most knowledgeable and 
prepared local community because of the specific knowledge needed, required 
speed of action, and the breadth of impact8 
 
Given the local limitations of training, equipping, and preparing local emergency 
responders for an LPHC event and the low threat level, an alternative approach 
should be considered for response to LPHC incidents. This alternative approach 
is to create national strike teams similar to DMAT, DMORT, and Urban Search 
and Rescue (USAR) that would address the specific types of LPHC events that 
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could occur. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) are comprised of 
professional and para-professional medical personnel who provide a rapid-
response element to supplement local medical care until other regional, state, or 
federal resources can be mobilized to address the given disaster.9 Likewise, 
Disaster Mortuary Assistance Teams (DMORT) are composed of private citizens 
with particular mortuary experience who are deployed, supervised, and 
compensated by the federal government to provide assistance during mass 
fatality events.10 USAR teams also provide local extrication and medical 
stabilization of individuals who are trapped in collapsed areas as a result of a 
natural disaster such as a tornado, earthquake, or technology failure.11 
The effectiveness of DMAT, DMORT, and USAR crews is well documented. For 
example, the Missouri DMAT team successfully established special-needs 
shelters in Springfield, Missouri, after a devastating ice storm flattened the local 
infrastructure.  Likewise, DMORT teams have found similar success in responses 
to terrorism, flash floods, tornados, hurricanes, and technological failures.12 The 
twenty-five federal USAR teams established since 1989 have been activated for 
LPHC events such as the Oklahoma City Bombing (1995) and the collapse of the 
World Trade Center towers (2001).  These types of national strike teams serve as 
successful models for other LPHC events. 
For example, rather than spending an estimated ten billion dollars nationally 
to achieve basic bioterrorism preparedness,13 national mass prophylaxis strike 
teams could be created and mobilized in association with activation of the 
Strategic National Stockpile. Each team would be comprised of individual experts 
who receive training, support, and equipment to establish regionalized national 
teams. These national mass prophylaxis strike teams would be moved into areas 
impacted by a bioterrorism attack to provide life-saving medications within the 
necessary window of twenty-four to forty-eight hours. This would eliminate the 
possibility that local jurisdictions are unable to provide the equipment and 
personnel to execute mass prophylaxis in the timeframe required to be life-saving 
(for example, exposure to anthrax requires high-dose antibiotics within forty-
eight hours).14 Moreover, if these national prophylaxis strike teams lead the 
operation, local assets, including personnel, can be better utilized in positions 
that only require basic just-in-time training. Therefore, rather than diversifying 
the experience, training, and planning over cities, counties, and states throughout 
the United States, these national prophylaxis team would centralize these assets, 
thus becoming much more operationally effective and fiscally responsible.   
Like the mass prophylaxis teams, agroterrorism preparedness also has its 
challenges. Starting in 2004, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security awarded 
approximately three million dollars to fourteen colleges and universities to create 
Agroterrorism Preparedness Centers. The goal for these centers was to train 
300,000 first responders and 20,000 master trainers in agroterrorism 
preparedness and response.15 Unfortunately, much like the bioterrorism 
preparedness funding, this type of training and preparedness has spread the 
knowledge and experience too thin. As previously discussed, local community 
emergency responders – even if trained – cannot handle LPHC events like 
agroterrorism in their communities without the support of specialized teams 
deployed from other areas, states, or the federal government. The monies 
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dedicated to agroterrorism training schools would be better utilized if these 
schools were training and supporting national agroterrorism strike teams. 
 
The creation and support of national strike teams would result in an operational 
and policy paradigm shift. From an operational perspective, emergency 
management is fundamentally a local event; that pattern must be adjusted to 
plan for the activation and use of a national strike team trained to respond to 
particular LPHC events. Local community leadership would also have to accept 
the loss of annual funding streams that have provided benefits to local emergency 
management and response agencies. Losing the funding streams meant to 
prepare local communities for LPHC events would be particularly difficult for 
these communities, considering the strong secondary applications and uses that 
funding provides (such as extra training, multi-function equipment, and 
additional emergency management personnel). Although both represent 
significant changes, the potential local economic loss is a more significant 
challenge than the operational changes and probably would be fought by elected 
officials from the funded areas. 
 
In conclusion, while billions of dollars have been distributed to local 
communities and states to prepare for LPHC events, the results are inconclusive. 
For instance, one study identified that 54 percent of Americans felt the country 
was less prepared for an act of terrorism than before the September 11 attacks on 
the World Trade Center and Pentagon.16 This inconsistency is a result of 
spreading the funding and preparedness over too many communities, thus 
diluting the overall effectiveness in preparing to respond to high-impact events 
that are very unlikely to occur. However, national strike teams like DMAT, 
DMORT, and USAR have provided quick and effective response to LPHC 
incidents including terrorism and technology failures. Consequently, the concept 
of adding additional national strike teams should be evaluated by FEMA and 
various large emergency management associations such the International 
Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) and the National Emergency 
Management Agency (NEMA). By working cooperatively, these agencies could 
fully evaluate the effectiveness of the current operational and funding paradigm 
for LPHC events and assess whether the national strike team model, as described, 
is a more effective approach to preparedness and response. 
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